



















Is the sickness absence of an individual affected by the sickness absence behavior of the 
neighbors? Well-known methodological problems, in particular the so-called reflection 
problem, arise when trying to answer such questions about group effects. Based on data 
from Sweden, we adopt several different approaches to solve these problems. Regardless 
of the approach chosen, we obtain statistically significant estimates indicating that group 
effects are important for individual sickness absence behavior.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The behavioral consequences of social insurance cannot be fully understood solely by 
reference to traditional medical entities, such as the health status of the population. Of 
course, economists would also emphasize economic incentives, such as prices (i.e., 
replacement rates) and income. One may however argue that these entities do not suffice 
to explain behavior; social interaction, for instance in the form of group effects on 
individual behavior, should also be taken into account. While group effects have been 
extensively analyzed theoretically, empirical analysis has been held back by 
methodological problems.
1 In particular, the so-called reflection problem (Manski, 1993) 
may make it difficult to distinguish causal group effects from other forms of correlations 
between group and individual behavior.  
 
In this paper we study how group behavior in terms of sickness absence influences an 
individual’s utilization of sick-pay insurance (“temporary disability insurance”), which is 
an important element of social insurance in Europe. Based on Swedish data, we ask two 
questions. Is there evidence that group influence exists in sickness absence behavior? 
And, if so, how large might those effects be?  
 
Social interaction may occur on several different arenas. For instance, national mass 
media may inform the individual what is considered as “normal” behavior in the nation as 
a whole. Social interaction may also take place within country-wide professions or 
organizations. In this paper, we focus on personal interaction at local levels, namely 
neighborhoods. More specifically, we exploit variation in absence behaviour across 
neighborhoods for the purpose of identifying social interaction, and we define group 
effects as the individual’s adjustment to normal behaviour among his or her neighbors. 
The basic idea is that encounters with neighbors are one important mechanism by which 
social norms are transmitted and upheld.
2  
                                                 
1 For general analyses of the influence of social norms on individual behavior, see, for instance, Parsons 
(1952), Moffit (1983), Bicchieri (1990), Lindbeck (1995), Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999), Manski 
(1993) and Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003). 
2 In Section 4, we also allow for influences from workmates.   2
 
While much of the previous empirical literature on group effects deals with interaction 
within ethnic networks, our study concerns interaction within geographical areas. This 
approach is feasible because our data contain neighborhood identification for every 
individual in Sweden. 
 
There are several characteristics of the Swedish sick-pay insurance system that facilitate 
the emergence of local benefit-dependency cultures. First, the replacement rates are quite 
high for a majority of employees (80-90 percent of previous earnings), which is likely to 
create a strong temptation to “overuse” the system (moral hazard). Second, the 
administration of the system was quite lax during the period under study, i.e., individuals 
themselves could to a large extent choose whether to live on sickness benefits.  Sickness 
spells longer than one week requires a doctor’s certificate, but there is strong evidence 
that doctors rarely turn down requests for such certificates. For instance, Englund (2008) 
found that doctors were prepared to provide certification in 80 percent of the cases where 
the doctors themselves believed that sick leave was either not necessary or even harmful 
to the individual. There is no limit to the number of days that an individual may receive 
sickness benefits. Moreover, empirical studies are facilitated by the fact that the system is 
government-run and mandatory, with the same rules applying throughout the country.  
 
The study utilizes a rich data set covering the entire Swedish population, with 
information on both each individual’s sickness history and various socioeconomic 
characteristics of the individual. When using this data set to study group effects, we apply 
four different approaches to deal with various econometric problems connected with the 
estimation of group effects. The first two approaches rely on rather weak identifying 
assumptions and are designed to find traces of group effects, without attempting to 
quantify these effects: 
 
A.  We investigate whether the behavior of an individual is influenced by the 
interaction between the network in his neighborhood and the network at his job.  
   3
B.  We ask whether individuals in Sweden who have moved from one neighborhood 
in to another tend to adjust their sickness absence behavior to normal (average) 
behavior in the new neighborhood. 
 
A more ambitious task is to quantify the magnitude of the group effects. For this purpose, 
we use two approaches that rely on somewhat stronger identifying assumptions: 
 
C.  We study whether immigrants to Sweden (basically refugees) have adjusted their 
behavior to that of native Swedes in the neighborhood where the immigrants have 
settled down. 
 
D.  We use an instrumental-variable approach, based on the different absence patterns 
of public-sector and private-sector employees. 
 
There is a growing empirical literature on group effects in such diverse fields as 
schooling, criminality, shirking within banks, and the choice of pension plans; see, for 
instance, Ammermueller and Pischke (2006), Sacerdote (2001), Glaeser et al. (1996), and 
Ichino and Maggie (2000), and Duflo and Saez (2002, 2003). A number of studies of 
group effects have also focused on the utilization of various welfare-state arrangements. 
For instance, Moffit (1983), Bertrand et al. (2000) and Åslund and Fredriksson (2008) 
have dealt with the utilization of social assistance (“welfare dependency”), Aizer and 
Currie (2004) have studied the utilization of publicly funded maternity care, while 
Hesselius et al. (2008) have analyzed the consequences for sickness absence of relaxing 
the requirements for medical certification.  
 
As is well known, the identification of causal group effects is fraught with statistical 
difficulties; we will address these difficulties in several different ways in this paper. 
There is, however, a more basic problem of interpreting such causal group effects. 
Suppose that the statistical problems have been satisfactorily dealt with, and a significant 
group influence has been identified. Then the question remains whether the influence 
reflects the dissemination of information or of social norms on the individual’s behavior.   4
For instance, Duflo and Saez (2002, 2003) point out that their estimates do not tell how 
much of the group effects is due to the transmission of information and how much is due 
to social norms. However, the study by Aizer and Currie (2004) is designed to make such 
a distinction for the participation in publicly funded maternity care. They assume that 
mothers who have previously used such care do have information about the availability 
of the services. The authors therefore argue that the estimated group effects for such 
mothers reflect social norms, rather than the transmission of information. 
 
Since the Swedish sick-pay insurance system is mandatory and uniform, the rules and the 
availability are well-known to all individuals in the country.
3 Indeed, in virtually all 
families, some individual has at least on some occasion visited a physician and utilized 
the sick-pay insurance system. By contrast, the pension plans studied by Duflo and Saez 
(2002, 2003) are quite complicated and difficult to digest; thus the dissemination of 
information is likely to be important in this case. However, the acquisition and 
interpretation of information about the Swedish sick-pay insurance system is a trivial 
task. This means that estimates of group effects can hardly be interpreted as the result of 
the dissemination of information about the availability of sickness benefits. This 
strengthens our interpretation of group effects as the result of social norms, rather than of 
information. 
 
A special feature of our study is that it investigates the robustness of the results in a 
fundamental way. Usually, robustness checks are done by variations in the vector of 
covariates within the context of one specific analytical approach. We have chosen a more 
comprehensive robustness check: in addition to varying the vector of covariates, we study 
group effects by trying several different models (namely approaches A – D mentioned 
above). In fact, it turns out that variations in the vector of covariates have very small 
consequences for the estimates of group effects. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Even immigrants are informed about the details of the social insurance system when settling down in 
Sweden.   5
2. A First Look at the Data 
 
Our data set combines individual sickness absence data from the Swedish National 
Insurance Agency with a large number of socioeconomic variables obtained from the 
LISA database, compiled by Statistics Sweden. In addition to providing information on 
numerous individual characteristics, the combined data set allows us to identify each 
individual’s neighborhood and workplace. The data consist of an unbalanced panel for 
the seven-year period 1996-2002. Although the data set covers the entire population in 
Sweden, we confine our study to private- and public-sector employees in the age group 
18-64 (almost 5 million individuals, generating about 25 million observations in the 
entire panel). The data set includes all spells of sickness absence longer than 14 days, all 
being paid for by the national insurance system.
4  
 
When studying local social norms, a first issue is to determine the most relevant 
geographical domain. Municipalities may be too large for this purpose. We therefore 
chose to use the so-called Small Area for Market Statistics unit (SAMS) for geographical 
domains in Sweden.
5 Such areas provide reasonably homogeneous districts based on 
geographical proximity among inhabitants and similarity in housing.
6 There are 8,951 
SAMS in our database, with an average population of 404 persons. In the following, we 
use the term “neighborhoods” for these areas. 
 
While acknowledging that social interaction may occur in different arenas, we focus on 
direct interaction at the personal level which is likely to be important when it comes to 
the formation and monitoring of social norms. For this purpose, the SAMS seems to be 
an appropriate geographical unit. 
 
                                                 
4 The reason why only spells longer than 14 days are included in the data is that the employer pays 
compensation for shorter spells, and individual data on such spells are not systematically reported. The total 
average number of paid sick days (including short spells) was about 25 per year during the period under 
study, as compared to 17.8 in our data set (which does not contain the first 14 days of a spell). 
5 See Statistics Sweden (2005) for a detailed description of this geographical specification.  
6 It turns out that our empirical results are approximately the same regardless of whether we use 
municipalities, church parishes or the SAMS as the basic geographical unit.   6
Let us first give a broad picture of local variations in sickness absence by looking at days 
of absence across neighborhoods during a single year, namely 2002, which is the last year 
in our panel. For this purpose, let  in S  denote the number of sick days of individual i 
living in neighborhood n in 2002, and  n S  the average number of sick days in that 
neighborhood. While the average number of sick days (above 14) in our data is 17.8, the 
standard deviation of  n S  is 13.2 days per year. How can this wide variation across 
neighborhoods be explained?  
 
First, to see whether the local variation simply reflects observable socioeconomic factors, 
we ran a multivariate regression of the form 
 
'
in in in SX αβ ε =+ +,     (1) 
 
where the X vector contains three types of socioeconomic variables: individual 
characteristics (such as age and education), characteristics of the individual’s workplace 
(such as industry and plant size), and neighborhood characteristics (such as urban/rural, 
local unemployment, and a local health variable). We have chosen explanatory variables 
that, in many studies, have turned out to be important for sickness absence. Due to the 
large number of observations, we have been able to apply a flexible specification of the 
regression equation, using dummies rather than specific functional forms; see Table A1 
in the Appendix for a full list of the variables in the X vector.
7 
 
As expected, the X vector explains very little of each individual’s behavior, since 
idiosyncratic factors tend to dominate at the individual level. More surprisingly, the X 
vector also explains very little of the variation in average sickness absence,  n S , across 
                                                 
7 We did not include income in the X vector because reported income is affected by the individual’s 
sickness absence. Including income among the explanatory variables would have given rise to a bias in the 
estimates. Several of our explanatory variables are, however, correlated with income – for instance, age, 
education, gender, and industry. As regards local unemployment, there are arguments for and against 
including it among the explanatory variables. Here, we report the results from regressions where local 
unemployment is included – although excluding it would not change the results noticeably in terms of the 
influence of social norms on individual sickness absence.    7
neighborhoods. While the standard deviation of average absence across neighborhoods in 
the 2002 raw data was 13.2 days, it was almost the same (12.9 days) after controlling for 
all of the socioeconomic variables in the X vector. To find out whether the remaining 
differences among neighborhoods (the average residuals  n ε )  are systematic rather than 
random, we also estimated an equation with neighborhood-specific intercepts  n α : 
 
'
in n in in SX α βε =+ +.     (1') 
 
An F test suggests that (1') fits the data significantly better than the original specification 
(1) with a uniform intercept (F = 2.650, implying significance at the one-percent level
8). 
To rule out the possibility that this simply reflects fixed unobservable factors, we also 
estimated (1) and (1') in terms of changes in sickness absence. As in the case of levels, 
the average residuals of changes between 2001 and 2002 across neighborhoods vary 
systematically, i.e., in a non-random fashion (F = 1.370, again implying significance at 
the one-percent level). Thus, there is systematic local variation in average sickness 
absence not accounted for by the socioeconomic factors in our X vector. As we have 
seen, this holds not only for levels, but also for changes. Indeed, this result holds for the 
entire panel, and not only for specific years. 
 
 
3. Measuring the Effect of Social Interactions 
 
Our basic hypothesis is that these large geographical differences in sickness absence – 
after controlling for a battery of social and economic variables – are related to differences 
in local social norms concerning benefit dependency. In other words, we assume that 
there are local variations in group effects on individual behavior. We then measure group 
behavior by the average number of sick-absence days in a neighborhood, and we would 
in principle want to estimate an equation of the following type: 
 
                                                 
8 See, for instance, Greene (2003, chapter 13).   8
  in n in in S ' X S ε γ β α + + + = ,     (2) 
 
where  n S  is the average absence of the neighbors of individual i; naturally, we have 
excluded individual i him/herself from the average.  
 
The idea behind equation (2) is that group behavior ( n S ) to some extent reflects 
prevailing sick-absence norms in the neighborhood, and that individuals tend to conform 
to such norms. We assume that the individual receives information about the norms when 
interacting with neighbors and observing their absence behavior. Basically, we refer to 
the same type of mechanisms as are often assumed in analyses of group effects in the 
fields of schooling, crime, drug use, unemployment etc.  
 
However, running an OLS regression on (2) is likely to yield an upward-biased estimate 
of γ . One reason is that it is difficult to distinguish the effects of social interaction from 
so-called contextual influences (such as unobserved heterogeneity). This difficulty 
reflects the fact that individuals who live in the same neighborhood are exposed to similar 
unobserved circumstances, such as environmental factors not included in the X vector. 
This may create a statistical relation between average behavior and individual behavior 
that is not the result of social interaction.
 9  
 
One specific example of contextual effects that may be misinterpreted as local social 
interaction is contagious diseases that hit some neighborhoods but not others. However, 
the only major epidemic that has hit the Swedish population in recent decades is ordinary 
influenza. Since sickness absence due to flu symptoms seldom lasts longer than two 
weeks, this kind of contextual effect is not important in our dataset.
10  
 
                                                 
9 Two alternative ways of dealing with unobserved heterogeneity are to estimate equation (3) on differences 
instead of levels, or to allow for individual fixed effects. However, these methods are feasible only if the 
heterogeneity is fixed. In realty, the factors underlying unobserved heterogeneity may very well change 
over time. 
10 From this point of view, the fact that our data set only covers spells of absence longer than two weeks 
may be regarded as an advantage rather than a limitation of the analysis – although from other points of 
view, a study of shorter spells would, in itself, also be informative.   9
Another type of contextual effects is that a shock may affect some specific population 
group (for instance, a particular profession or age group) and that this group happens to 
be relatively large in certain neighborhoods. To the extent that such effects are 
observable, they may be taken into account simply by inserting the average 
characteristics of individuals in the neighborhood,  n X , into the regression equation (2); 
we have done so when relevant in our regressions. However, we cannot guarantee that 
non-observable heterogeneity does not exist in the data – a problem shared with all 
econometric studies not based on controlled experiments. The most obvious example in 
our study is perhaps that individuals might self-select into neighborhoods.  As always in 
this type of analysis, it is therefore necessary to make specific identifying assumptions to 
differentiate between causal group effects and other influences; these assumptions will be 
specified and discussed later on. 
 
Contextual effects and/or unobserved heterogeneity among individuals are the 
background to the “reflection problem” mentioned in the introduction. In a naïve 
regression of equation (2), one would simply obtain an estimate of the relation between 
the behavior of the representative individual and the behavior of the average individual – 
i.e., basically the same individual. Indeed, such a regression gives  8658 . 0 ˆ = γ , which is 
significant at the one-percent level, reflecting an upward bias in the estimate. Our 
adoption of four different approaches, mentioned in the introduction, is intended to avoid 
such a bias.  
 
 
4. Approach A: Interaction between Neighborhood and Workplace Networks 
 
One way of analyzing the effects of social interaction without running into the reflection 
problem may be to ask whether the strength of an individual’s network contributes 
significantly to explaining his behavior. We may assume that social norms and attitudes 
are transmitted more easily when individuals meet in more than one arena. We therefore 
ask whether an individual is more influenced by their neighbors if he also meet them at   10




To deal with this issue we estimate the following model:  
 
inwt inwt n w t nt inwt inwt inwt CA S CA X S ε ϕ μ κ λ ν β α + + + + + ⋅ ⋅ + + = ) ( ' ,      (3) 
 
where the subscript w denotes the workplace. Here,  inwt S  is the number of days of paid 
sickness absence (for sick spells longer than two weeks) of individual i, living in 
neighborhood n and working at workplace w, at time t.  inwt CA  is defined as the fraction of 
the individual’s neighbors who are also his coworkers; it can be regarded as a measure of 
the additional strength of the network facing individual inw at time t when he belongs to 
two different networks. The parameters  t λ ,  w κ  and  n μ  are fixed effects for year, 
workplace and neighborhood, respectively.
12 Hence we deal with the reflection problem 
by identifying group effects on the interaction term, controlling for fixed workplace and 
neighborhood effects.  
 
The fixed effects  n μ  and  w κ  control for omitted variables in the X vector.
13  In addition, 
equation (3) includes the density (concentration) measure   inwt CA  separately. This allows 
us to control for the possibility that the strength of the network in itself may be correlated 
                                                 
11 It is conceivable that group effects are particularly easily transmitted within homogeneous subgroups of 
neighbors or coworkers. For example, Duflo and Saez (2003) found that group effects are stronger within 
subgroups (of the same gender, of the same age, etc.) than for the entire population within a workplace. 
Bokenblom and Ekblad (2007) also found that inter-individual influences on sickness absence in public-
sector workplaces in a Swedish city occurred mainly within gender and age groups.  
12 Equation (3) has basically the same analytical structure as the corresponding equation in Bertrand et al. 
(2000). In an analysis of the utilization of social assistance (“welfare” in U.S. terminology) among ethnic 
minorities in the United States, they studied the interaction between language groups and neighborhoods. 
13 The vector  i X  in (3) is a subset of the previously used X vector, in the sense that neighborhood and 
work place characteristics have been excluded. The reason is that the neighborhood and workplace 
variables in X become redundant when we enter neighborhood and workplace fixed effects into the 
regression equation. The network-intensity variable only varies on the neighborhood/workplace level; we 
therefore adjust the standard errors for clustering within the cells consisting of the intersection of 
neighborhoods and workplaces (see e.g. Moulton, 1986).  
 
   11
with unobservable characteristics systematically related to the propensity to be absent 
from work. Our identifying assumption then presumes that there is no correlation 
between the interaction term  nt inwt S CA ⋅  and any remaining non-observable variables that 
affect sickness absence, i.e., 
( ) ( ) t w n inwt nt inwt t w n inwt nt nt inwr inwt X S E X S S CA E λ κ μ ε λ κ μ ε , , , , | , , , , , | = ⋅ . 
 
Table 1 shows the results from the OLS estimation. The parameter ν ˆ is significantly 
different from zero. Thus, the regression is consistent with our hypothesis that an 
individual’s behavior is more affected by his neighbors if he also meets some of them at 
his workplace. In other words, we find evidence of social interaction on sickness absence: 
the strength of networks affects the extent to which average behavior influences 
individual sickness absence. We calculate the marginal effect with respect to changes in 
average absence in the neighborhood, i.e.,  n inw S S ∂ ∂ / ; it is easily seen to be equal to 
inwt CA ⋅ ν . This number tells us how an increase in the average absence  nt S  in a 
neighborhood influences individual absence through the interaction between 
neighborhood and workplace networks.  
 
The estimates in Table 1 mean that if the average absence in an average Swedish 
neighborhood increases by ten days, the strength-of-network effect adds 0.5 days to the 
average individual’s absence. The fact that the parameter estimate is significant at the 
one-percent level is a strong indication that group effects actually exist.  
 
However, this approach identifies only a limited aspect of social interaction, namely the 
accentuation of neighborhood effects through the interaction of two networks. Thus, the 
estimate of ν  in equation (1) tells us whether there is an additional network effect for 
individuals who are not only neighbors but also coworkers. The coefficient ν , therefore, 
represents only a small fraction (an accentuation) of total social interaction within 
neighborhoods.  
 
   12
  Table 1: The strength-of-network effect.  
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  4,693,560 







Yes No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Note: *** indicates significance at the one-percent level.  
The numbers of observations and individuals in this table are somewhat smaller than the 
corresponding numbers in subsequent tables. The reason is that for each individual, we deleted the 
individual himself from the data when computing the averages  n S . For some neighborhoods, 




4. Approach B: Movers within Sweden 
 
In the previous section, we dealt with the reflection problem and issues of unobserved 
heterogeneity by including neighborhood and workplace fixed effects in a regression 
equation with an interaction term  nt inwt S CA ⋅  as explanatory variables. In this section, we 
use another approach. We control for the individual’s type by looking at changes in 
absence behavior when individuals move from one neighborhood to another. 
 
More specifically, we investigate whether individuals who have changed neighborhood 
within Sweden change their absence behavior towards the average behavior in the new 
neighborhood.
14 As an illustration of the analysis, we first look at individuals who have 
lived in the new neighborhood for only one year. Denoting the old neighborhood by m 
and the new by n, we estimate the following model: 
 
                                                 
14 Ichino and Magi (2000) carried out a similar analysis of employees at a large Italian bank who have 
moved from one branch to another.   13
       
,1 ,1 1 ,1 2
,1 ,1 ,1 ,1
'' ' ' () ( )
() ()
mover mover mover mover all all
int im t t int im t int im t
non mover non mover non mover non mover
nt mt i t nt mt i n m t







−= + + − +− +
+ ⋅−+ ⋅ ⋅−+
 (4) 
         
where  
 




non mover non mover
it n t m t
if individual i has moved at time t to an area with










We use this specification to investigate whether people who move from neighborhood m 
to neighborhood n adjust their behavior in response to the difference in average absence 
between these two neighborhoods. However, there is no reason to expect that individuals 
are equally likely to adjust to neighbors with high sickness absence as to neighbors with 
low. We therefore use two coefficients η  and δ  to capture such adjustment. If  0 ≠ η  and 
0 = δ  the adjustment is symmetric (the individual adjusts his behavior symmetrically 
when moving to a neighborhood with higher and lower absence). If, on the other hand, 
0 δ ≠ , the adjustment is asymmetric.  
 
The reflection problem is avoided since we have entered absence for different groups of 
people on the left-hand side (movers) and right-hand side (non-movers) of the regression 
equation. Our identifying assumption in this analysis is that people who plan to change 
their absence behavior in the future do not tend to move to neighborhoods with a 
particular level of average sickness absence. This means that people are assumed to move 
for a variety of reasons (such as changes in the family, in the job prospects, etc.) but not 
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  Table 2: Movers within Sweden, equation (4) 
 
  No. of 
ind.: 1,551,059 
obs.: 2,202,466  
2 R   η ˆ  δ ˆ  
 
Including both X 





















Inluding neither X 











The estimates are reported in Table 2. We note that  ˆ η  is not significantly different from 
zero, while  ˆ δ  is. This result is robust regardless of whether we include the X and  X  
vectors in the regression or not. This suggests an asymmetric effect in the sense that the 
individual adjusts his behavior if he moves to a neighborhood with a higher average 
absence, while he makes no such an adjustment (at least not within the time span of one 
year), when moving to a neighborhood with a lower absence. According to these 
estimates, individuals seem to find it easier to adjust to “bad” habits than to “good” 
habits.  
 
Clearly, it does not seem likely that individuals make full adjustment to the average 
behavior in a new neighborhood within a year. We have therefore also estimated equation 
(4) for movers who have lived in the new neighborhood for two and three years, 
respectively.
15  These results are given in Table 3. 
 
 
                                                 
15 This means that we have replaced the t – 1 time index in equation (4) by a t – k (k = 1, 2, 3) index.   15
  Table 3: Estimates of equation (4), including both the X and the  X  vector, 
  for movers who have lived in the new neighborhood for one, two and three 
 years. 
 
After one year 
 
After two years 
 







2 R  0.0055 
η ˆ  -0.012 
     (0.0122) 
δ ˆ    0.040** 






2 R  0.0076 
η ˆ  -0.007  
      (0.0197) 
δ ˆ     0.051* 
      (0.0304) 
Number of 
ind.:  
  993,972 
obs.:  
1,014,338 
2 R  0.0101 
η ˆ  -0.008 
      (0.0279) 
δ ˆ    0.080* 
      (0.0455) 
 
 
Table 3 shows that the asymmetry remains when analyzing a somewhat longer period of 
residence than one year. The quantitative effect of the asymmetric effect increases along 
with the time of residence, although the significance falls. Thus, the adjustment seems to 
increase over time, but it is still rather weak after three years. This suggests that the 
adjustment by newcomers to a neighbourhood is a rather prolonged process.  
 
As we have pointed out before, short-term effects shown in Tables 2 and 3 should be 
regarded only as evidence of group effects, rather than the full magnitude of such effects. 
We now turn to the issue of quantifying the full size of group effects, which requires 
stronger identifying assumptions than the ones we used sin Sections 4 and 5. 
 
 
6. Approach C: Immigrants 
 
Quantifying the full size of group effects means estimating the coefficient γ  in equation 
(2), while at the same time dealing with the reflection problem and issues connected with 
unobserved heterogeneity. Needless to say, the identifying assumptions can always be 
questioned in empirical analyses based on non-experimental data. It is therefore useful to 
try alternative approaches, with different identifying assumptions. In this section, we   16
study group effects by asking whether immigrants adjust to the absence behavior of 











int S X X S ε γ β β λ α + + + + + = 2 1




int S  is the number of sick days of immigrant i in neighborhood n at time t, while 
s
nt S  is the average number of sick days among native Swedes in that neighborhood. We 
avoid the reflection problem since the absence variable on the left-hand side refers to a 
different group of people than the absence variable on the right-hand side. We are thus 
again able to rely on OLS. We apply the identifying assumption that there is no tendency 
among immigrants with a high propensity for sickness absence to settle down in 
neighborhoods where the absence rates among natives are particularly high (“reverse 
causation”). 
 
Of course, our assumption that immigrants adjust their behavior to that of native Swedes 
does not mean that immigrants would receive their norms solely through interaction with 
Swedes. Most immigrants may very well acquire the Swedish norms indirectly, through 
their interaction with individuals in their own ethnic group – among which some 
individuals may in turn have been influenced directly by native Swedes. 
 
Since we have data on each individual’s country of origin, we can also investigate 
whether immigrants with a cultural background similar to that of Swedes tend to adjust 
more than other immigrants to the behavior of native Swedes. The rationale for this 
question is that one would expect that such immigrants are particularly likely to interact 
with Swedes. 
 
As we want to study the transmission of norms to immigrants, it is natural to exclude 
neighborhoods where immigrants constitute a majority of the population. Indeed, we 
confine this regression to neighborhoods where the fraction of immigrants is less than 30   17
percent of the total population.
16 The results are shown in Table 4. To check the 
robustness of the model, we also report estimates from regressions where we deleted the 
variable  nt X  from equation (5). In an alternative specification, we replaced  nt X  by a 
neighborhood fixed effect  n μ , intended to capture unobservable fixed factors in the 
neighborhood. The estimates are quite robust to these alternative specifications. We 
confine our comments to the case where the  nt X  vector is included (the middle column 
of the γ  estimates in Table 4). 
 
According to these highly significant estimates, sickness absence among the immigrant 
group as a whole is about 0.4 days higher in a neighborhood where average absence 
among Swedes is one day higher than in another neighborhood. This number is an 
attempted estimate of the total group effect (i.e., the parameter γ  in equation (2)). We 
would expect that this is an underestimation of the group effects for the country’s 
population as a whole, since immigrants are likely to have weaker networks with native 
Swedes than does the total population. This presumption is consistent with the 
observation from Table 4 that the estimated group effects are stronger for immigrants 
from Nordic countries ( ) 6 . 0 ≈ γ  and EU countries ( ) 4 . 0 ≈ γ  than for immigrants from 
other countries with less cultural affinity to Sweden. 
 
                                                 
16 We also tried 20 and 50 percent; the results are quite insensitive to the choice of cut-off value.   18
Table 4: Estimates of γ  in equation (5) with (i) the  X  vector included, 
































*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
Region  Number of ind. 
and obs. 
             Estimate of γ  
     (i)                 (ii)                (iii) 











   193,221 ind. 
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Africa       28,924 ind. 
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Asia     136,059 ind. 








Oceania         3,405 ind. 
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Including  nt X  vector  No Yes  No 
Including fixed effects  n μ   No No Yes   19
Is it possible that the highly significant estimates reported in Table 4 reflect unobservable 
heterogeneity rather than social interaction, thereby violating our basic identifying 
assumption? One mechanism behind such heterogeneity could be that immigrants with a 
particular characteristic that is not included in our X vector have wound up in 
neighborhoods where the natives have a similar characteristic. Although there are strong 
exogenous elements in the geographical distribution of immigrants across neighborhoods 
in Sweden,
17 we cannot fully rule out the possibility that immigrants with a strong 
propensity to call in sick in fact have settled down in areas with many Swedes of a 
similar inclination. It does not seem likely that immigrants consciously choose such a 
strategy; not even native Swedes, who have been living in the country for decades, have  
information about differences in sickness absence across the country.  
 
There may, however, be indirect mechanisms for such a selection – although it is difficult 
to find convincing examples of such mechanisms. One conceivable mechanism is 
selection on neighborhoods based on the labor-market ambitions of individuals, assuming 
that high ambitions are correlated with low sickness absence. It might be the case that 
ambitious individuals – immigrants as well as native Swedes – settle down in areas with 
strong labor markets. As a consequence, both native Swedes and immigrants in such 
areas may have relatively low absence rates. However, it should be observed that labor 
markets are much larger areas than neighborhoods. For instance, the large cities of 
Sweden, where many immigrants live, may each form one labor market, but comprise 
hundreds – or even thousands – of neighborhoods. This means that selection based on 
labor markets is not very closely related to selection based on neighborhoods. Thus it 
does not seem very likely that a selection mechanism based on labor-market ambitions 
would result in a situation where immigrants with a high propensity to be absent from 
work tend to settle down in neighborhoods where native Swedes have the same 
inclination. 
 
                                                 
17 Political refugees, who have formed the dominant immigrant category in Sweden in recent decades, have 
usually been allocated by the authorities to geographical areas with empty (rent-controlled) apartments.   20
Although the hypothetical selection mechanism discussed above may seem farfetched, it 
should be taken seriously. In order to assess the importance of permanent unobserved 
heterogeneity (as opposed to the observed heterogeneity reflected in the  X  vector) we 
have also estimated equation (5) with fixed neighborhood effects. The estimates from 
such a regression are reported in column (iii) of Table 4. We see that the coefficient 
estimates are quite insensitive to whether we include fixed neighborhood effects or not. 
One possible interpretation is that it is unlikely that the estimates of group effects simply 
reflect unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
In summary, while our estimate of the coefficient  4 . 0 ≈ γ  may suffer from a downward 
bias (since immigrants may have weaker networks with Swedes than does the population 
as a whole), there might also be an upward bias (due to a conceivable, but perhaps not 
very likely, selection of immigrants on neighborhoods). 
 
 
7. Approach D: Exploiting Inter-Sectoral Differences in Absence Behavior 
 
Another way of estimating γ  without running into the reflection problem is to use an IV 
approach, exploiting the difference in sickness absence between private-sector and 
public-sector employees. While the average number of days of sickness absence in our 
data set (spells longer than 14 days) in 2001 was 12.2 for private-sector employees, it was 
15.4 for central government employees and 20.3 for municipal employees. There may be 
several reasons for these differences. The most obvious one is that private employers 
have stronger incentives than public-sector employers to prevent absence, since it is 
costly to the former. It could also be the case that workers with preferences for frequent 
absence tend to self-select into the public sector. 
 
For these reasons, neighborhoods with a large share of public-sector employees are, on 
average, likely to have a higher work-absence rate than other neighborhoods. We exploit 
this fact and use the share of public-sector employees as an instrumental variable for the 
average work-absence level in a neighborhood. The identifying assumption underlying   21
this approach is that the share of public-sector employees in a neighborhood is unrelated 
to unobserved characteristics affecting individual work-absence behavior; formally, 
() 0 int = ε nt Z E , where nt Z  is the public sector’s share of employment in neighborhood n in 
year t.
18  Thus we assume that workers with specific absence behavior do not choose to 
reside in neighborhoods on the basis of the proportion between public- and private-sector 
employees in these neighborhoods. In other words, we assume that the different behavior 
of these two groups of employees is related to the institutional features of the sectors 
where they work, rather than to unobserved individual differences. We will return to this 
issue. 
 
Using  nt Z  as an instrument for average sickness absence in neighborhood n, we apply the 
following IV model, with not only  int X  but also  nt X  among the covariates,
19 to explain 






int nt int int t
priv
int
nt nt nt int t nt
S ' X ' X S
e cZ b ' X b ' X k a S
ε γ β β λ α + + + + + =
+ + + + + =
   (6) 
  
Conversely, we use  nt Z − 1  as an instrument to estimate the effects on individual public-
sector employees, 
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We also estimate a system like (6) and (6') for the entire population, i.e., without 
superscript priv or publ on the S in the second equation.  
                                                 
18 More exactly, Z is the ratio of the number of public-sector employees to the sum of public- and private-
sector employees. 
19 The  X  vector is defined as the neighborhood average of all covariates, with the exception of the age 
dummies. For computational reasons, we have reduced the number of variables by using the average age in 
the neighborhood (1 variable), rather the share of each age group in the neighborhood (46 variables).    22
 
However, before pursuing the IV analysis, let us (without estimating γ ) investigate 
whether there are any traces of group effects in the neighborhoods. More specifically, we 
ask whether the absence of a private-sector employee is higher if he has many neighbors 
who work in the public sector, and vice versa. We therefore study the reduced form of the 
model defined in equations (6), i.e.,  
 
   int nt int int t
priv
int Z X X S ε μ β β λ α + ⋅ + + + + = 2 1




int S  is the sickness absence of individual i in the private sector in year t. We 
expect the estimate of μ  to be positive.  
 
Conversely, we ask whether a public-sector employee tends to be less absent from work 
if he lives in a neighborhood where there are many private-sector employees: 
 
  int nt int int t
publ
int Z X X S ε μ β β λ α + − ⋅ + + + + = ) 1 ( ' '
2 1    (7’) 
 
As a robustness check, we also ran all regressions without an  X  vector on the right-hand 
side. It turns out that the coefficients then change only marginally. When commenting on 
the estimation results, we focus on the case where the  X  is included. The results of these 
estimates are shown in the fourth column of Table 5. 
 
As expected, a higher share of public-sector employees in a neighborhood is associated 
with higher sickness absence among private-sector employees in that neighborhood. The 
number 0.045 in Table 5 means that if the share of public-sector employees is 10 
percentage points higher in one neighborhood than in another, then sickness absence 
among the privately employed is approximately 0.45 days higher in the first 
neighborhood. Similarly, if the share of private employees in one neighborhood is 10 
percentage points higher in than in another, the number of sick days among public-sector 
employees is 0.37 days lower.    23
 
 (Table  5) 
 
For completeness, we have also carried out reduced-form estimates based on the entire 
population (private- as well as public-sector employees). The number 0.041 means that if 
the share of public-sector employees in a neighborhood is 10 percentage points higher 
than in another, the average number of absence days among all employees is 0.41 days 
higher. 
 
Note that the estimate of μ  is only intended to reflect the influence on sickness absence 
of the proportion of public-sector employees in a neighborhood; it does not provide a 
quantification of how much average behavior influences individual behavior. To obtain 
such quantification, an estimate of  γ  in the full IV model of equations (6) and (6’) is 
required. The resulting estimates of these equations are shown in the fifth and sixth 
columns of Table 5. 
   24
Table 5: Estimates of  μ  in (7) and (7'), and of  γ  in (6) and (6') 
Population  Number of  
individuals and 
observations 
Regressor  Reduced form:  
μ  in equation (7)  
First step in IV 
regression: c in eq. (6) 
IV estimate:  
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Including  nt X  vector  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.   25
Let us first look at the last column in Table 5, with the estimate γ  = 0.698. According to 
this estimate, a typical private-sector employee has 0.698 more sick days if he lives in a 
neighborhood where the average number of sick days is one day higher than in another 
neighborhood. Similarly, a typical public-sector employee would have 0.595 more sick 
days in the corresponding situation. For the entire population (private plus public 
sectors), a person who lives in a neighborhood with an average that is one day higher 
than in another neighborhood would have 0.654 more sick days. 
 
For these estimates to be credible, it is necessary that the instrument is good in the sense 
that not only  0 ) , ( = nt n e Z Cov , but also  0 ) , ( ≠ n n S Z Cov . The latter condition is clearly 
satisfied. The first-step estimates of equation (3), reported in column five, indicate that Z 
is a very strong instrument for the average absence in a neighborhood; the standard 
deviations are minuscule relative to the coefficients. 
 
It is more difficult to know whether the condition  0 ) , ( = nt n e Z Cov  is satisfied. As 
pointed out earlier, our estimates are based on the identifying assumption that there is no 
tendency among individuals with a high innate propensity for sickness absence to self-
select into neighborhoods with many public-sector employees. As an objection to this 
assumption, one might speculate that our results at least partly reflect selection 
mechanisms, although it is difficult to conceive of plausible mechanisms for such 
selection. Theoretically, one mechanism might be that the availability of physicians is 
higher in neighborhoods with many public-sector employees; as a result, the cost for the 
individual of obtaining a doctor’s certificate would be lower in such a neighborhood. 
However, this is not a plausible mechanism. The availability of medical care is very high 
all over Sweden, and it would be far-fetched to assume that physicians are 
disproportionally allocated to areas with many public-sector employees. It is equally 
implausible that public-sector employees are particularly prone to settle down in 
neighborhoods with good access to physicians.  
 
Another conceivable selection mechanism would be based on a negative relation between 
career ambitions and the propensity to take sick leave. The story would be that   26
individuals with modest ambitions often choose to work in the public sector and that low-
ambition individuals in the private sector tend to settle down in areas where they can find 
neighbors with similar attitudes. In principle, this would create unobserved heterogeneity 
(in terms of career ambitions) which could violate our identifying assumption. To shed 
light on this possibility, we assume that the education level is a reasonable proxy for an 
individual’s career ambitions. We therefore estimate two “placebo” equations that are 
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If low-ambition individuals (as defined here) would self-select into neighborhoods with 
many public-sector employees, the coefficient  1 μ  should be negative, and the coefficient 
2 μ  positive. However, it turns out to be just the opposite:  ∗ ∗ ∗ = 113 . 0 1 μ  and 
2 0.198 μ ∗∗∗ =− . Thus, our “placebo experiment” suggests that the estimates of γ  in 
Table 5 are not biased upward by unobserved heterogeneity with respect to career 
ambitions. Rather, such heterogeneity might bias the estimates downward. This result 
holds regardless of whether we include  X  as a regressor or not (see Table A2 in the 
Appendix). Our conclusion about group effects on sick-absence behavior is therefore not 
an artifact due to selection based on heterogeneous career ambitions. The estimates may 
rather understate the size of group effects.  
 
Even if it is hard to conceive of plausible selection mechanisms giving an upward bias to 
our estimates of γ  in Table 5, there may be unobserved “contextual” variation across 
                                                 
20 Needless to say, this formulation removes the individual’s education has from his X vector.   27
neighborhoods (i.e., factors not included in our vector of observables). It may be 
tempting to control for such factors by introducing neighborhood dummies, for instance 
by replacing α  with  n α  in equations (6)-(7). However, such dummies would absorb the 
influence of our instrument  n Z  and hence invalidate our notion of permanent benefit 
cultures in some neighborhoods and not in others.
21 
 
To summarize, our analysis yields estimates of γ  in the interval 0.6 – 0.7. These 
estimates are surprisingly similar to the estimate of γ  in Section 6 of 0.6 for immigrants 
from the Nordic countries. However, to the extent that we have not been able to solve the 
problem of unobserved heterogeneity (mainly self-selection of individuals on 
neighborhoods) these estimates would be biased upwards. However, it should be noted 
that the conceivable selection mechanisms are quite different in the two cases. In the 
analysis of Section 6, an upward bias may occur if immigrants with particular labor-
market ambitions would settle down in neighborhoods (not just labor-market regions) in 
which native Swedes have the same ambitions, and labor-market ambition is correlated 
with sickness-absence behavior. In the analysis of Section 7, an upward bias may occur if 
private-sector employees with a particularly strong inclination to call sick would settle 
down in neighborhoods with many public sector employees – although our placebo test 







8. Concluding Remarks 
 
                                                 
21.   28
We have used four different approaches to trace neighborhood effects on absence 
behavior. They all yield results that are consistent with our hypothesis that such effects 
do exist. Each approach relies on a specific identifying assumption:  
 
A.  The model of interaction between neighborhood networks and workplace 
networks in Section 4 relies on the assumption that there is no correlation 
between unobservable variables and the term for network interaction. 
 
B.  The analysis of movers within Sweden in Section 5 relies on the 
assumption that individuals who expect to increase (decrease) their 
absence do not choose to move to neighborhoods with a high (low) 
average absence rates.  
 
C.  Our analysis of immigrants in Section 6 relies on the assumption that 
immigrants with a high propensity to be absent from work have not settled 
down (as a result of administrative discretion or self-selection) in 
neighborhoods with particularly high absence rates among native Swedes.  
 
D.  The private- vs. public-sector model in Section 7 relies on the assumption 
that private-sector employees with a high propensity to call sick do not 
self-select into neighborhoods with a high share of public-sector 
employees. 
 
We have tried to answer two questions: Is there evidence of group effects on individual 
sickness absence? And if so: What is the magnitude of such effects? As for the former 
question, all four approaches point to the existence of such effects. Since, in particular, 
approaches A and B rely on rather weak identifying assumptions, we may conclude that 
group effects do exist in this context. However, a limitation of these two approaches is 
that they do not deal with the magnitude of the full effects. By contrast, approaches C and 
D were designed to estimate the full effects, and both provide quantitatively similar 
estimates. Approach C suggests that one day longer average absence leads to about 0.4   29
days longer absence for the representative individual (although the number is 0.6 for 
immigrants from the Nordic countries), while the corresponding estimate in approach D 
is about 0.6 days. This means that the “social multiplier”  )) 1 /( 1 ( γ −  in our data set is in 
the interval 1.7 – 2.5.  
 
Naturally, there is no reason to expect that social multipliers are of the same magnitudes 
for all types of behavior, in every country, and at every point in time. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that surprisingly similar multipliers have been estimated in the U.S. for 
such different areas as school achievements due to interaction among room mates, 
criminal behavior, and human capital spillovers. Except for one outlier (= 8.2), a survey 
by Glaeser et al. (2003) reports social multipliers in the interval 1.4 – 2.2, to compare 
with our estimates 1.7 – 2.5.  
 
Previous research has shown that coinsurance and controls, in a wide sense, affect the 
utilization of social programs. Our study shows that such policy measures also have 
indirect long-term effects through norms and social interaction in society. This is 
important to consider when designing a well-functioning social insurance program.   30
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Appendix 
  Table A1: Explanatory variables in the X vector 
For the individual  Age (all ages from 18 to 64, one dummy for each 
age, i.e., 46 dummies) 
 
  Education (seven levels, one dummy for each level, 
from primary school to graduate university degrees, 
i.e., six dummies) 
  Gender (one dummy) 
 
  Marital status (single, married/cohabitating, 
divorced; two dummies)  
 
  Has children aged 3 or younger (one dummy) 
 
  Region of origin (Sweden, Northern Europe, rest of 
Europe, etc.; 10 dummies) 
For the workplace  Industry (60 industries, i. e., 59 dummies) 
 
  Sector (central government, state-owned enterprise, 
local government, local government-owned 
enterprise, private firm, etc.; 11 sectors, i.e., 10 
dummies)* 
 
  Size of workplace (21 dummies: 1 employee, 2-10, 
11-20, 21-30, …, 91-100, 101-200, 201-300, …, 
901-1000, 1001-9999 employees) 
For the neighborhood  Urban or rural (one dummy) 
 
  Life expectancy in the municipality (average, 
gender-specific life expectancy among the 291 
municipalities in Sweden) 
 
  Local unemployment (expressed as the incidence of 
unemployment, i.e., the fraction of the labor force 
in the neighborhood that has received 
unemployment compensation at least once during 
the year. 19 dummy variables, one for each 5-
percent interval) 
 
             * The distinction between industry and sector is that the former refers to the type  
                of product or service produced, while the latter refers to ownership characteristics. 
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Table A2: Estimates of the “placebo” regressions (7a) and (7a’) with and without 
the  X  vector. 
 
 
Population  Number of  
individuals and 
observations 
Regressor Reduced  form: 






  2,839,410 ind. 
14,556,753 obs. 
Share of population 
in neighborhood n  
that works in public 















  1,956,740 ind. 
10,502,405 obs. 
 
Share of population 
in neighborhood n  
that works in 
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  4,796,150 ind. 
25,059,158 obs. 
Share of population 
in neighborhood n  
that works in public 










Including  nt X  vector  No Yes 
 